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ISSN 1109-6691 Editorial 
  The South-Eastern European Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) is a 
community of financial historians, economists and statisticians, established in April 
2006 at the initiation of the Bulgarian National Bank and the Bank of Greece. Its 
objective is to spread knowledge on the economic history of the region in the context 
of European experience with a specific focus on financial, monetary and banking 
history. The First and the Second Annual Conferences were held in Sofia (BNB) in 
2006 and in Vienna (OeNB) in 2007. Additionally, the SEEMHN Data Collection 
Task Force aims at establishing a historical data base with 19
th and 20
th century 
financial and monetary data for countries in the region. A set of data has already been 
published as an annex to the 2007 conference proceedings, released by the OeNB 
(2008, Workshops, no 13). 
On 13-14 March 2008, the Third Annual Conference was held in Athens, 
hosted by the Bank of Greece. The conference was dedicated to Banking and Finance 
in South-Eastern Europe: Lessons of Historical Experience. It was attended by 
representatives of the Albanian, Austrian, Belgian, Bulgarian, German, Greek, 
Romanian, Russian, Serbian and Turkish central banks, as well as participants from a 
number of universities and research institutions. Professor Michael Bordo delivered 
the key note speech on Growing up to Financial Stability. The participants presented, 
reviewed and assessed the experience of SE Europe with financial development, 
banking and central banking from a comparative and historical perspective. 
The 4
th Annual SEEMHN Conference will be hosted by the National Serbian 
Bank on 27
th March 2009 in Belgrade. The topic of the Conference will be Economic 
and Financial Stability in SE Europe in a Historical and Comparative Perspective. 
  The papers presented at the 2008 SEEMHN Conference are being made 
available to a wider audience in the Working Paper Series of the Bank of Greece. 
Here we present the ninth of these papers, by Nikolay Nenovsky, Martin Ivanov and 
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This paper studies the dynamics of the bank efficiency in Bulgaria in the years 1923 
and 1928. In the course of research several interdependencies were detected, related 
mainly to the reaction of different types of banks to the financial crisis and the 
financial stabilization. Official bank balance sheets were used as well as the profit and 
loss statements of 50 Bulgarian credit institutions. After their classification into sub-
groups different variations of DEA (data envelopment analysis), in particular the 
intermediation approach, were applied to the banks’ financial positions. The DEA 
overcomes several deficiencies in the traditional accounting measurement of bank 
efficiency, which has made it very popular in latest literature. To our knowledge this 
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This paper mainly explores the empirical measurement of the Bulgarian 
banking system’s efficiency over the twenties. The period covers an important time 
span of the Bulgarian monetary stabilization, in particular from the beginning of the 
monetary stabilization in 1924, going through the official pegging of the lev in 1928, 
until the eve of the Great Depression. The banks’ efficiency has been assessed by 
applying one of the sophisticated empirical technique (Data Envelopment Approach, 
DEA), which enables comparison of the efficiency of both individual banks and bank 
groups based on selected criteria. The calculations relate to the two years – 1923 and 
1928, thus allowing some comparison of the results for the banks’ efficiency. The 
results help approbation of a number of theoretical hypotheses and assumptions as 
well as “discovery” of new, so far neglected or unknown theoretical relationships.      
First – insomuch as the banking system (and its structure) was able to play the 
role of a “substitute institution”, a phrase coined by Alexander Gerschenkron, 
mobilizing capitals needed for Bulgaria’s industrialization. As is well-known, 
Gerschenkron believes that to catch up with developed economies (or reduce the time 
for industrialization) backward and undercapitalized peripheral economies need 
substitute institutions. In Gerschenkron’s view such institutions can be universal 
banks, the state or even ideology (in the case of USSR)
1. 
Second, as mentioned above, it would be useful to compare efficiency across 
various types of banks (grouping of could be based on various criteria like ownership, 
assets volume, regionality, etc). Over the period, the diversity of banks is conditioned 
by the fact that the banking market was segmented. Diversity was a response to the 
need of finding different ways of collecting dispersed savings, or seen from another 
perspective – of accommodating the various types of informational asymmetry
2.  
Third, the selected years (1923 and 1928) help answer the question as to what 
extent and in what way bank efficiency is conditioned by different factors such as 
type of monetary regime (the years 1924-1928 are characterized by stabilization of the 
lev), capital inflows (1926 Refugee Loan and the 1928 Stabilization Loan), and an 
                                                 
1  For details see, Sylla and Toniolo (2001), Sylla (2005) and Gershenkron (1962, 1952).  
2 This is shown in a number of studies; see, for example Karklisiiski (1941), Tugan-Baranovsky (1989, 





institutional factor like the absence of systematically regulated accounting norms of 
banks and the general lack of information transparency. We need also to mention that 
the overall financial system safety net, i.e. lender of last resort, deposit insurance, etc., 
starts functioning in the early thirties, i.e. the years after the Great Depression. 
The study can lead us to some other methodological dependencies. As we 
already mentioned, the 20ies are characterized by lack of information transparency 
which is reflected in fabricated or misrepresented banks’ balance-sheets and profit 
and loss accounts. A common practice was the so-called “connected or insider 
lending” (Kossev, 2008). An empirical analysis of efficiency gives important 
indications about the bad behavior of banks, which is manifested in banks’ failures. 
For instance, a case of discrepancy between a bank’s high efficiency (measured based 
on official records’ data) and a subsequent failure of that bank calls for a concrete 
historical investigation which could reveal the actual reasons for such failure. In other 
words, a discrepancy like this could take us to new and interesting economic and 
financial relationships, as well as to a close study of archive records.    
The structure of the paper is as follows: first, we give a short overview of the 
basic facts and events in Bulgaria’s monetary and banking history, thus placing bank 
efficiency into a concrete historical context. The second part describes the 
methodology fundamentals of measurement as well as the data employed and its 
sources. The third part discusses the empirical findings and the conclusion examines 
possible future research studies.    
 
2. Bulgaria (1923-1928): facts from the monetary and banking 
history  
  Following a series of political and financial cataclysms, in 1924 Bulgaria re-
established the prewar principles of monetary orthodoxality within the context of the 
Europe-wide dominating gold exchange standard. In 1926 under League of Nations’ 
stabilization program the BNB was granted further autonomy and in 1928 the lev was 
pegged de jure to the dollar. The stabilization was backed up by a special Stabilization 
Loan granted by a Consortium of American and British banks under League of Nation 




The financial stabilization achieved boosted up the country’s economic 
recovery. After a few years of severe cataclysms, in 1925 the prewar level of the GNP 
per capita was exceeded and in the following years a moderate growth of economy 
achieved (Ivanov, 2006). In the context of this relatively stable environment the 
banking system played an important role for the economic growth. It was gravely 
affected by the hyperinflationary spiral in early 20ies with sector incomes going down 
to half their 1911 level. For comparison, the added value in agriculture and industry in 
1921 remained at prewar levels (98% and 112% of the 1911 added value, 
respectively). However, between 1924 and 1929 the real incomes in the financial 
services area increased twofold from 1.1 to 2.2 billion levs. A gradual increase of 
deposits across all sub-segments of the banking sector is a further evidence of 
restoring confidence in the banking system.    
 
 
Table 1: Bank deposits, in million levs (1921 prices) 
 
   1921 1923 1925 1929  Real  growth 
in % for the 
period 1921-
1929 
State-owned banks  1935 2662 2975 3366  73.90%
Private banks  2343 2529 2463 3473  48.20%
Building societies  0 0 0 173.2  -
Agricultural co-operations  179.2 222.3 278.8 510.5  184.80%
Popular banks  84.8 124.6 342.6 877.9  935.30%
  
Total   4542 5538 6059 8916  96.30%
Source: Own estimates, Statistical Annual, BNB Bulletin. 
 
 
The data in the table indicate that those benefiting most from the macro-
stabilization were the rural and town co-operations (popular banks), followed by the 
state-owned banks. The private credit institutions found it hardest to win the public 
confidence with deposits attracted going up by only 48% - much below the 
performance of the public financial institutions.  
The 1920s deepened the trend of bank market segmentation already started in 
the first decade of the 20




of the state the rural and town co-operations were able to strengthen their previous 
grounds and on the eve of the Great Depression the industry expanded to include a 
new competitor – the so-called building societies. Operating as quasi banking 
institutions these specialized in long-term mortgage lending. As private initiative was 
more and more squeezed down in scope, competition among these banks (around 140 
at the time) spurred up further. Their priority remained financing of industry and trade 
while the public and cooperative credit head-offices financed mainly the agricultural 
sector.  
The macroeconomic stabilization and the two external loans granted under the 
guarantee of the League of Nations (1926 Refugee Loan (7%) and 1928 Stabilization 
Loan (7.5%)) allowed Bulgaria to find a place on the global investment map. The high 
interest rate differential between the country’s and the external interest rate levels 
provoked the interest of major international financial institutions such as the French 
Paribas and the Deutsche bank. The increased capital inflows and the downpour, 
within a short time, of “gold rain” from the Stabilization Loan resulted in substantial 
growth of the local financial institutions’ lending activities. Only a year after it 
started, credit inflation exceeded prudent levels and undermined the banking sector 
stability.   
 
Table 2: Volume of banks’ loan portfolio  
(at current prices, in million levs)  
 




State-owned banks  2654  3689  4622  74% 
Private banks  3452  4991  6448  87% 
Cooperative banks  313  1449  1961  512% 
Total 6419  10128  12986  102% 
Source: Own estimates, Statistical Annual  
 
 
The macroeconomic risks of the inflation were further aggravated in the 
absence of information transparency and the almost entire lack of a state-regulated 
banking sector. The only tools the BNB could employ were annual examinations of 




played a role similar to today’s Bulgarian Agricultural Bank, while the town banks 
come closer to the currently operating Bulgarian Central Co-operative Bank) and 
refinancing through rediscounting of their portfolio. Both instruments however can 
only roughly tune the system. No matter how thoroughly or scrupulously conducted, 
examinations are quite an inflexible form of monitoring as they take place long after 
the end of the financial year with findings normally becoming available not until 
another eight to ten months. In an environment of easy access to external financing, 
portfolio rediscounting is also of limited impact. The reduced Central Bank’s credit 
was easily compensated by borrowing from abroad.  
  The absence of legislative regulation reduced the information transparency of 
the financial sector to the minimum. The balance sheets published (not always and not 
by all) were not standardized and so enabled risk players to conceal or show all sorts 
of accounts under a single item. Misrepresentation and «window-dressing» of balance 
sheets were public secret; still, counter-actions were taken only in the heat of the 
crisis in 1931. Even a sketchy overview of historical events in the 30ies allows us to 
formulate some assumptions and hypotheses.   
Without any pretense of exhaustiveness, it could be assumed that with 
monetary stabilization in place the banks’ efficiency in Bulgaria increased. This 
occurred as a result of the imposed financial discipline and boosted competition in the 
banking sector. Second, it could be expected that foreign and state-owned banks in 
general would have higher efficiency than local private institutions. This is both on 
account of the limited resource and the sharp shortage of capital, as well as the more 
direct relationship between the private banks’ efficiency and the achieved 
macroeconomic stabilization. Third, the lacking accounting standards, deficient 
information transparency and imperfect regulatory framework of the banking sector 
would naturally have an adverse bearing on the banks’ efficiency level. Due to the 
opposite nature of the above two effects (monetary stability and lack of transparency) 
it is difficult to determine a priori which of the effects would outweigh the other; yet 
overall the expected benefits of the lev stabilization are a weaker than anticipated 
improvement. Fourth, the capital inflow (capital injection from abroad in the form of 
the two external loans) in an environment of unclear banking rules brings detriment 




difficult to evaluate and measure the effects independently; nevertheless an empirical 
assessment could provide some valuable information. 
 
3. Measuring banks’ efficiency: theoretical premises and empirical 
problems  
Over the last years a number of new approaches have emerged for measuring 
the DMU (decision making units’) efficiency and productivity, mainly associated with 
the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Stochastic Frontier approach (SFA) 
(Coelli et al., 2005). These approaches were also applied to the banking systems of 
most countries, to mention just a few studies by Grigorian and Manole, 2002; Jemric 
and Vujcic, 2002; Pawlowska, 2005; Fiorentino et. al., 2006; Luciano and Regis, 
2007; Loukianova 2008, and others, Bulgaria including: Nenovsky et al., 2004; 
Nenovsky et al., 2007. As far as we know, DEA has not been applied to historical 
data as it is difficult to compile a database of banks’ inputs and outputs in the absence 
of detailed, standardized or regularly published balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts. In such cases it is much easier to use traditional measurements such as ROE 
and ROA.  
In short (in the case of banks) DEA is a method of linear programming to 
assess the efficiency of individual banks against a defined efficiency frontier (the 
most efficient banks), which is derived from the model itself. This frontier indicates 
the maximum efficiency possible, and banks are positioned on or below it with the 
distance indicating the loss of potential efficiency. DEA is an approach alternative not 
only to the traditional ROE and ROA indicators, but to regressional analysis as well 
(while regressional analysis is based on estimation of average trends, DEA is based on 
frontier scores measurement). DEA advantage is that it does not involve a pre-
formulated format of the production function; its drawbacks however come from the 
fact that it is highly dependent on extreme findings and can not tell what part of the 
divergence from the frontier stands for the bank’s inefficiency and what – for random 
error. There are two forms of DEA (Chart 1), one showing the divergence 




showing the divergence (inefficiency) АВ with regard to inputs –  frontier (right 
Chart)
3. In this particular case the inefficiency level is measured with δ = OA/OB. 
 
 





If we show the production function q = f(x) on Chart 2, then the rate of 
inefficiency input-measured is drawn by AB/AP, and the rate of inefficiency output-
measured is drawn by CP/CD. 
 
 





                                                 
3 Actually the major microeconomic objectives are being reproduced, namely profit maximization at a 




The last element of importance in measuring banks’ efficiency or inefficiency 
respectively is the use of Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) of a bank’s production 
function, which makes up for the unrealistic assumption of Constant Returns to Scale 
(CRS) (see Chart 3).  
 
 





The movement of inefficiency in segment AB in the Chart indicates increasing 
economy of scale and the logical expectation would be for the banks to merge 
(because they are very small), while segment BC points to a decreasing economy of 
scale, hence the expectation that the banks would decentralize their activities into 
separate production units. Point В is known in economic literature as a point of 
optimal scale of a given bank which is often referred to as TOPS – technologically 
optimal scale of production.  
Depending on the particular bank’s functions we wish to examine, we can 
discriminate among a number of DEA constructions (operating approach, 
intermediation approach, production approach, value added approach, user cost 
approach, asset approach)
4. The discrimination actually results from the choice of 
input and output variables. We use the intermediation approach, which treats a bank 
as a mediator transforming funds between depositors and investors. In this case and 
                                                 




based on the construction of banks’ balance sheets in the ‘20s we have the following 














The inputs involved in the intermediation approach are the labor and capital 
which a bank has and uses for the production of its outputs. Since there are no 
available data for measuring labor (the number of employed per banks), we use 
variables that indirectly reflect the labor in an individual bank unit. For this purpose 
we take two variables – the total value of a bank’s assets and the bank’s 
administrative costs. The bank’s assets can be used as an approximator of labor in so 
far as the bank’s size determines the amount of labor needed for the functioning of the 
bank. If, however, the labor of a bank at an initial point of time is more productive 
than the labor of another bank of the same size, then at a next point the first bank will 
have accumulated larger amount of assets. It is also possible that banks of equal size 
have different number of employed. This is in the case where a bank with less human 
resources needs to put additional workload on the existing ones (therefore the value of 





number of employed (total 








A bank’s administrative costs can also be used since they reflect labor costs. 
We need to have in mind that administrative costs also include rental and electricity 
costs, etc., but the available data do not allow for their disaggregation by type. 
Although the administrative costs, as defined in the Proffit&Loss account, cover other 
costs as well, this is a better indicator of the banks’ inputs than assets are, since during 
the reference period most of the banks were small production units and so, for 
instance, did not have their own buildings to carry out their activities. Thus, they 
incurred rental costs reflected in the administrative costs, i.е. capital expenses are 
taken into account (for those of the banks that did not own real property).  
We use for inputs also the banks’ fixed assets and the attracted deposits that 
serve as a source of financing of their principal activities, i.e. lending to economic 
agents and securities investments, which are the basic outputs. Since for the purpose 
of measuring labor two variables are used (a bank’s total assets and its administrative 
costs), calculations are made for the two variations in order to compare the results. 
Due to more serious disadvantages of using a bank’s total assets as an indicator of 
labor, we give priority to the results of the model employing administrative costs. The 
results from the models should nevertheless outline the same dependencies in spite of 
some quantitative differences.  
As stated above, the banks’ balance sheets over the reference period were not 
standardized, which necessitated processing of data to isolate the variables used in the 
model. While not pretending to exhaustiveness, the balance sheet (Table 3) given 
below is an aggregation of almost all items that can be found in the individual balance 
sheets of the bank units. The Profit&Loss account (Table 4) also indicates more than a 
few differences in the way it is presented, but overall the impression is that costs and 























The banks’ efficiency is calculated for the years 1923 and 1928. The data used 
in the various calculation models were published in the State Gazette (see data 
sources at the end of the paper). As the publication of banks’ balance sheets in the 
State Gazette was not a requirement at that time, not all existing banks disclosed their 
performance to the public. The group of banks included in the efficiency calculation 
were determined in the following manner: from the available balance sheets 
promulgated in the State Gazette for the two years (1923 and 1928) the banks singled 
out are among those operating in both these years, of which the fifty largest were 
taken. In the model using administrative costs as an indicator of labour (Model 2) the 
number of banks in the group is forty-six because four large banks from the group of 
fifty banks did not publish their Profit&Loss accounts.   
For the purpose of this research and for validating the hypotheses the banks 
are grouped in terms of their ownership as well as based on whether they merged or 
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examined: private Bulgarian banks, private foreign banks, state-owned banks, merged 
banks or banks that went bankrupt as a result of the crisis. 
 
4. Discussing the findings  
The banks’ efficiency is estimated using the models of constant returns to 
scale and variable returns to scale (CCR-model and BCC-model). The CCR-model 
was developed by Charnes et al. (1978), while the BCC-model was defined by Banker 
et al. (1984). The efficiency scores calculated under the BCC-model are higher than 
the efficiency scores under the CCR-model. The BCC-model compares DMUs with 
the DMUs, operating in the same region of returns to scale, while the CCR-model 
compares DMUs in the whole sample. To determine the efficiency scores we use the 
software DEAFrontier developed by Joe Zhu. The results presented below are based 
on the BCC-model, i.e. the assumption of variable returns to scale has been applied. 
We consider this model as the most appropriate one since normally the units operate 
under variable returns to scale. This has been also confirmed by the model 
calculations. 
The first model (Model 1), which uses as inputs the value of total assets, fixed 
assets and deposits, and as outputs – securities and loans, indicates some decrease in 
the efficiency across individual bank units and a greater number of banks forming the 
efficiency frontier (in 1923 the number of efficient banks is 10, while in 1928 they are 
13). In addition, the comparison of results indicates equalization of the banking 
system, i.е. most of the banks that were far from the efficiency frontier in 1923 came 
closer to it in 1928. This is also confirmed by the decreased standard deviation over 



















Note: The banks with efficiency score 1 form the efficiency frontier. The maximum 









Note: The banks with efficiency score 1 form the efficiency frontier. The maximum 
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The second model (Model 2), which uses administrative costs, fixed assets 
and deposits as inputs, and securities and loans as outputs, also indicates an increase 
in efficiency across the bank units, with some of the banks showing substantial 
efficiency (see, for example, Turgovski sgovor
5). This Model also shows an 












Note:  The banks  with efficiency score 1 form the efficiency frontier. The maximum 











                                                 
5 Further down we have given a comment on this significant increase in the efficiency of this small 
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Note: The banks with efficiency score 1 form the efficiency frontier. The maximum 






The aggregated results for the group of banks as a whole indicate a significant 
improvement in the efficiency in the reference years under all models. The increase in 
efficiency is higher in Model 2 where administrative costs are used as an indicator of 
labour. This is possibly due to a better optimization of administrative costs in 1928 
when the banks managed their inputs better. A possible reason for the significant 











                                                 
6 Over the period, a great number of these banks conducted not only banking but ‘real’ economic 
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Table 5: Banks’ efficiency (all banks) 
 
    1923  1928 1923 1928  1923  1928 















STDEV  0.24903  0.21776 0.25021 0.21885  0.30874  0.25373 
MEDIAN  0.66139  0.75914 0.65725 0.72405  0.32851  0.74350 
AVERAGE  0.68499  0.74866 0.66934 0.73786  0.44573  0.73101 
MIN  0.17284  0.34891 0.17284 0.34891  0.11733  0.14321 
MAX  1.00000  1.00000 1.00000 1.00000  1.00000  1.00000 




10  13  8  12 17 19 
Note: In Model 1 the results of the whole group of fifty banks are shown, while in Model 1.1 the results 
of the forty-six banks included in the calculation of efficiency as per Model 2. Model 1 and Model 1.1 
use as inputs the amount of banks’ total assets, their fixed assets and deposits, while Model 2 employs 
administrative costs, fixed assets and deposits.   
 
 
The improved efficiency of the group of banks is a result of the growing 
competition which is also evidenced by the reduced concentration measured with the 




Table 6: Concentration ratio (the four largest banks) 
 
 1923  1928 
Banks’ assets  79.3% 75.0% 
Credits, provided to banks’ clients  87.8% 80.1% 
Deposits of banks’ clients  74.5% 71.1% 
 
 
The efficiency analysis by bank groups – private Bulgarian banks, state-owned 
banks and foreign banks confirms the hypothesis that the foreign banks are the most 
efficient as they are equipped with more sophisticated technological resources, and 
therefore they manage better their administrative costs. We should have in mind that 
the foreign banks which are basically set up with external funds and foreign 
ownership, pose higher requirements when managing their resources for better 







Table 7: Banks’ efficiency (private foreign banks) 




Model 1:   
Assets_VRS 
Model 1:   
Assets_VRS 
Model 1.1:  
Assets_VRS 
Model 1.1:  
Assets_VRS 
Model 2:  
Administrative 
costs_VRS 
Model 2:  
Administrative 
costs_VRS 
STDEV  0.22951 0.05884 0.27842 0.07038  0.21471  0.00000 
MEDIAN  0.92296 0.99739 0.87838 1.00000  1.00000  1.00000 
AVERAGE  0.81682 0.96363 0.79206 0.96481  0.89265  1.00000 
MIN  0.41149 0.85923 0.41149 0.85923  0.57058  1.00000 
MAX  1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000  1.00000  1.00000 




3 3 2 3  3  4 
Note: In Model 1 the results of the whole group of fifty banks are shown, while in Model 1.1 the results 
of the forty-six banks included in the calculation of efficiency as per Model 2. Model 1 and Model 1.1 
use as inputs the amount of banks’ total assets, their fixed assets and deposits, while Model 2 employs 
administrative costs, fixed assets and deposits.   
 
The most significant improvement of efficiency in the reference years is 
observed with the private Bulgarian banks. Nevertheless, their efficiency level is quite 
low due to their limited resource. Their intra-group equalization is the highest; i.e. the 
banks with a very low efficiency score move faster to the efficiency frontier possibly 
because they are more dependent on monetary stabilization. The unregulated increase 
of their credit portfolio as a result of substantial insider lending leads to serious 
improvement of their efficiency score; the results however should be cautiously 
interpreted. The accelerated growth of credit portfolios and the widening of exposures 
to special persons put these bank units at risk (for details see, Turgovski sgovor). 
 
Table 8: Banks’ efficiency (private Bulgarian banks) 




Model 1:  
Assets_VRS 












STDEV  0.23532 0.20323 0.23478 0.20555  0.26265  0.24956 
MEDIAN  0.64331 0.65547 0.63303 0.66883  0.28026  0.68646 
AVERAGE  0.66019 0.68930 0.65342 0.69156  0.37166  0.68380 
MIN  0.17284 0.34891 0.17284 0.34891  0.11733  0.14321 
MAX  1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000  1.00000  1.00000 




5 6 4 5  3  3 
Note: In Model 1 the results of the whole group of fifty banks are shown, while in Model 1.1 the results 
of the forty-six banks included in the calculation of efficiency as per Model 2. Model 1 and Model 1.1 
use as inputs the amount of banks’ total assets, their fixed assets and deposits, while Model 2 employs 




The state-owned banks are more efficient than the local Bulgarian banks and 
less efficient than the foreign banks. The group of state-owned banks includes the 
Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), which during the first of the investigated years plays 
the role of a commercial bank accumulating considerable resources channeled 
gradually to increasingly longer-term investment projects. It is among the banks 
forming the efficiency frontier. The policy of the state aimed to provide incentives to 
the state-owned banks brings these banks to the foreground, thereby distorting 
competition in the banking system.   
 
Table 9: Banks’ efficiency (state-owned banks) 
 




Model 1:   
Assets_VRS 
Model 1:   
Assets_VRS 
Model 1.1:   
Assets_VRS 
Model 1.1:   
Assets_VRS 
Model 2:   
Administrative 
costs_VRS 
Model 2:   
Administrative 
costs_VRS 
STDEV  0.40642 0.25270 0.40642 0.25270  0.39881  0.25270 
MEDIAN  0.65437 1.00000 0.65437 1.00000  0.66835  1.00000 
AVERAGE  0.64814 0.87365 0.64814 0.87365  0.65513  0.87365 
MIN  0.28382 0.49460 0.28382 0.49460  0.28382  0.49460 
MAX  1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000  1.00000  1.00000 




2 3 2 3  2  3 
Note: In Model 1 the results of the whole group of fifty banks are shown, while in Model 1.1 the results 
of the forty-six banks included in the calculation of efficiency as per Model 2. Model 1 and Model 1.1 
use as inputs the amount of banks’ total assets, their fixed assets and deposits, while Model 2 employs 
administrative costs, fixed assets and deposits.   
 
 
The results for the banks that failed after the Great Depression indicate (see 
Tables 10 and 11) that most of them operated increasing returns to scale. For the 
production units, to function at increasing returns to scale and operate more 
efficiently, they could have merged as normally these were small units, in which any 
further employment would lead to higher specialization of labour. The fact that they 
did not merge and did not benefit from the scale could be a reason for their greater 
vulnerability during the crisis, and subsequently for their failure. What also makes an 
impression is that some of the banks, although on the efficiency frontier or very close 
to it, also failed after the crisis. This could as well be as a result of their accumulation 
of considerable amount of loans that led to increased efficiency in 1928. Still, the 




made to measure the impact of bad loans; however, the calculations showed no 
change in the results. The reason for this is that with no regulations in place the banks 
did not state correctly the amount of their bad loans in their balance sheets, which 
leads to underestimation of this effect. In order to establish how much some of the 
banks owe their high efficiency to credit expansion, they will have to be studied 
individually.       
 
Table 10: Bankrupt banks (Model 1.1) 
 
Bank’s Name  1923 Return of 
(to) scale 
1928   Return of 
(to) scale 
Banka na tutunoproizvoditelite  0.7212  Decreasing  0.4586  Increasing 
Napreduk  0.5389  Decreasing  0.3631  Increasing 
Union  0.6536  Increasing  0.5405  Increasing 
Zora  0.5175  Increasing  0.5619  Increasing 
Asbarez  0.5727  Increasing  0.6346  Increasing 
Otechestvo  0.8818  Decreasing 1.0000 Increasing 
Banka za turgovia i kreit  0.6619  Decreasing  0.5723  Increasing 
Banka za turgovia industria I 
knijnina 
0.7736  Decreasing  0.5563  Increasing 
Banka na suedinenite industrii  0.2217  Increasing  0.5190  Increasing 
Bulgarska kreditna banka  0.1728  Increasing  0.5471  Increasing 
Turgovski sgovor  1.0000  Decreasing  0.9135  Increasing 
Burgaska banka  0.5181  Decreasing  0.5904  Increasing 
Suedinenie  0.7422  Decreasing  0.5503  Increasing 
Bulgarska garancionna banka  0.6270  Increasing 1.0000  Increasing 
Bulgarska spestovna banka  1.0000  Increasing  0.7905  Increasing 
Bulgarska stopanska banka  0.6330  Increasing  0.8311  Increasing 
Bulgarsko-amerikanska banka  1.0000  Decreasing  1.0000  Constant 
Bulgarsko-populiarna banka  0.4333  Decreasing  0.4915  Increasing 
Vidinska banka  0.6609  Increasing  0.8302  Increasing 
Gornooriahovska banka  0.8343  Increasing 1.0000  Increasing 
Dupnishka turgovska kreditna 
banka 
0.6988  Increasing  0.7924  Increasing 
Evreiska populiarna banka  0.8520  Increasing  1.0000  Increasing 
Elenska turgovska banka  0.2300  Increasing  0.3489  Increasing 
Iznosno-vnosna banka  0.5246  Increasing 1.0000  Increasing 
Industrialna banka  1.0000  Decreasing  0.7872  Decreasing 
Loveshka turgovska banka  0.9188  Decreasing  0.6688  Increasing 
Oriahovska turgovska banka  0.3021  Increasing  0.5015  Increasing 
Plevenska turgovska banka  0.5650  Decreasing  0.4722  Increasing 
Selsko-esnafska banka  0.8946  Increasing  0.3982  Increasing 
Sofiiska banka  0.4459  Decreasing  0.4739  Increasing 
Trakiiska banka  0.6112  Decreasing  0.7311  Increasing 
Zemledelec  0.4210  Increasing  0.9806  Increasing 
Turgovsko kreditna banka  0.4270  Decreasing  0.9164  Increasing 





Table 11: Bankrupt banks (Model 2) 
 
Bank’s Name  1923  Return  of 
scale 
1928 Return  of 
scale 
Banka na tutunoproizvoditelite  0.1757  Increasing  0.6601  Increasing 
Napreduk  0.1173  Decreasing  0.4425  Decreasing 
Union  0.1430  Increasing  0.5920  Increasing 
Zora  0.4782  Increasing  0.3529  Increasing 
Asbarez  0.2816  Increasing  0.6105  Increasing 
Otechestvo  0.5157  Increasing 1.0000  Increasing 
Banka za turgovia I kreit  0.3671  Increasing  0.5152  Increasing 
Banka za turgovia industria I 
knijnina 
0.3861  Decreasing  0.7549  Increasing 
Banka na suedinenite industrii  0.1866  Increasing  0.1432  Increasing 
Bulgarska kreditna banka  0.1334  Increasing  0.4297  Increasing 
Turgovski sgovor  0.3957  Increasing  0.9502  Increasing 
Burgaska banka  0.1833  Increasing  0.7097  Increasing 
Suedinenie  0.2535  Increasing  0.2413  Increasing 
Bulgarska garancionna banka  0.4734  Increasing 1.0000  Increasing 
Bulgarska spestovna banka  1.0000  Increasing  1.0000  Increasing 
Bulgarska stopanska banka  0.2729  Increasing  0.6865  Increasing 
Bulgarsko-amerikanska  banka  1.0000 Constant  1.0000 Constant 
Bulgarsko-populiarna banka  0.1556  Increasing  0.3439  Increasing 
Vidinska banka  0.6588  Increasing  0.7359  Increasing 
Gornooriahovska  banka  1.0000 Increasing  1.0000 Increasing 
Dupnishka turgovska kreditna 
banka 
0.2179  Increasing  0.7511  Increasing 
Evreiska populiarna banka  0.5610  Increasing  0.8316  Increasing 
Elenska turgovska banka  0.1423  Increasing 1.0000  Increasing 
Iznosno-vnosna banka  0.1646  Increasing  0.8899  Increasing 
Industrialna banka  0.3308  Increasing 1.0000  Constant 
Loveshka turgovska banka  0.1993  Increasing  0.8745  Increasing 
Oriahovska turgovska banka  0.1684  Increasing  0.7016  Increasing 
Plevenska turgovska banka  0.3262  Increasing  0.4698  Increasing 
Selsko-esnafska banka  0.4177  Increasing  0.9734  Increasing 
Sofiiska banka  0.2803  Decreasing  0.4994  Increasing 
Trakiiska banka  0.2894  Increasing  0.6851  Increasing 
Zemledelec  0.1208  Increasing  0.2906  Increasing 
Turgovsko kreditna banka  0.1657  Increasing  0.9453  Increasing 
Plovdiv  0.6309  Increasing  0.5411  Increasing 
 
 
The banks that merged reveal that they operated at decreasing returns to scale and 
their logical policy would have been to split up. This is also as a result of the state 







Table 12: Merged banks  
 
   1923  1928  1923  1928 




Return of scale 
Balkanska banka*  0.9230  0.9893  Decreasing Decreasing 
Bulgaria 0.5729  0.7071  Increasing Increasing 
Banka za naroden 
kredit 
0.8132 0.6421  Decreasing Decreasing 
Bulgarska banka*  0.9107  0.6056  Decreasing Decreasing 
Bulgarska zemedelska 
banka 
1.0000 1.0000  Decreasing  Decreasing 
Bulgarska centralna 
kooperativna banka 
0.2838 0.4946  Decreasing Decreasing 
Internacionalna banka 
Bulgaria 
0.3087  1.0000 Increasing  Decreasing 
Kreditna banka*  0.6265  0.9974  Decreasing Decreasing 
Gradivo 0.9797  0.7170  Increasing Increasing 
Franko-belgiiska banka 
za Bulgaria 
0.4115  1.0000 Decreasing  Decreasing 
Franko-bulgarska 
ipotekarna banka 
1.0000 1.0000  Decreasing  Decreasing 
        
        
   1923  1928  1923  1928 






Return of scale 
Balkanska banka*             
Bulgaria 0.27975  0.57079  Increasing Increasing 
Banka za naroden 
kredit 
0.26879 0.87064  Decreasing Decreasing 
Bulgarska banka*          
Bulgarska zemedelska 
banka 
1.00000 1.00000  Decreasing  Decreasing 
Bulgarska centralna 
kooperativna banka 
0.28382 0.4946  Decreasing Decreasing 
Internacionalna banka 
Bulgaria 
0.33671  1.00000 Increasing  Decreasing 
Kreditna banka*          
Gradivo 0.96936  0.55728  Increasing Increasing 
Franko-belgiiska banka 
za Bulgaria 
0.57058  1.00000 Decreasing  Decreasing 
Franko-bulgarska 
ipotekarna banka 
1.00000 1.00000  Decreasing  Decreasing 
 
 
The significant improvement of efficiency of some of the banks requires 




to some new economic and financial dependencies. Such is the case with the small 
provincial bank Turgovski sgovor whose archives have revealed interesting facts.  
The bank was established in 1919 by a group of local merchants and producers 
of rice in Pazardjik. In parallel with their financial operations until 1925 the company 
was also engaged in trading and ran their own shop in the town. The serious 
difficulties were not long in coming and around 1926 – 1927 Turgovski sgovor was 
“in possession” of 1179 thousand levs in judicially protested portfolio out of a total of 
1732 thousand levs in extended loans. Overstated as these audit data might seem 
(circa 70% non-performing loans) it is more than clear that the bank was in deep 
crisis. The newly appointed management in 1927 was received with high hopes by the 
BNB local branch in Pazardjik. In the words of the bank clerk the new Management 
Board had a chance to clear away the “bad heritage” as its members possessed “high 
morals” and the bank’s director was “very energetic”.   
  In 1928 the fixed capital of Turgovski sgovor increased from 1 to 2 million 
levs. Attempts were made to cut down administrative costs with the director assuming 
the functions of cashier as well after the position was closed. The situation however, 
as evident by the last audit (if we can rely on the last audit findings), remains “not 
really good” and after 1927 dividend payment was not resumed. The new examination 
report prepared in 1931, however, paints a bleak picture. The report no longer 
mentions the Management Board’s “high morals”, or the director’s enthusiasm. This 
time the new BNB auditor points out that “the members of the Management Board 
show little interest in the company’s activities” as they were engulfed in their private 
business. The management was actually in the hands of the director, Assen G. Petrov, 
a son-in-law of one of the major shareholders, Nikola Ivanov. The bank was rusted by 
insider loans: “The Management Board and the key shareholders have used the bank’s 
funds widely for their own needs; yet another portion they have granted to closely 
related persons”. The loans to connected persons amount to 2663 thousand levs, with 
deposits being only 1380 thousand levs. Of equal concern is the conclusion that “the 
bank’s trade turnover over the last three years can not be estimated due to constant 
transformation of accounts and their keeping jointly (on a disaggregated basis) with 
other accounts”. Some idea about the size of impaired assets could be obtained by the 




Table 13: Adjusted asset of Turgovski sgovor for the years 1927 – 1931, in 
thousand levs 
 
  1927 1929 1930 1931 
Balance-sheet 
asset* 
3992.9 5104.7 7827.2 6995.9
Adjusted 
asset** 
3600.3 4619.6 6273.9 4716.3
Percentage of 
impairment 
-9.83 -9.50 -19.84 -32.58
Source: Central State Archives 
Note:* Based on publications in the State Gazette, ** Based on the BNB audit 
 
 
The in-depth study of Turgovski sgovor in Pazardjik reveals problems that can 
be found at an individual level: (i) Financial institutions do not show truthfully their 
bad loans in their published balance sheets. They swell their portfolios by including 
non-performing loans, i.e. empty assets to puff up phony efficiency; (ii) Opaque 
account keeping. If we cite once again the audit report for the year 1931: “constant 
transformation of accounts and their keeping jointly with other accounts (on a 
disaggregated basis)”. (iii) Even the BNB is not always a reliable external auditor. 
Often, the case depends on local involvements and/or lack of professional skills 
locally. Thus, the change of the auditor (in 1931) led to a radical revision of the 
assessment of the bank’s financial position.        
The above findings and problems indicate that the DEA results need to be 
cautiously interpreted. The data on input and output variables verified on a bank-by-
bank basis especially for the smaller banks whose results given below the models 
point to high efficiency whereas they actually did not perform so efficiently. An 
investigation of these banks at an individual level will be carried out at a later stage of 
studying the banks’ efficiency in past periods. When handling historical data, 
researchers inevitably face this kind of difficulties, which necessitates additional 
studying of archive records to overcome them.  
  
5. Conclusions and directions for further research  
The attempt to apply DEA to historical data on the Bulgarian banking system 




theoretical dependencies. In general, it confirms the basic hypotheses from economic 
literature about the role of the banking system in peripheral countries: the banks’ 
efficiency increases with the development of monetary stabilization; the private 
foreign banks and the state-owned banks demonstrate the highest efficiency while the 
Bulgarian private institutions are the least efficient. In spite of the existing differences 
one can observe an equalization of efficiency in the late 1920s, in comparison with 
the initial date in the analysis (1923), which points to a higher competition. 
Nevertheless, the BNB is one of the most efficient banks as it is almost always on the 
efficiency frontier, which is in a sense an illustration of violating the principles of free 
competition. In spite of our endeavors to have a model clear of any “bad loans” in 
order to see the impact of “credit inflation” resulting from the two external loans, the 
findings as a whole are not very satisfactory due to undisclosed data on accumulated 
bad receivables. The case of Turgovski sgovor is a vivid illustration of the lack of 
transparency concerning balance-sheet reporting. As to the returns to scale analysis, it 
largely confirms the relationship that the banks performing on the frontier of 
increasing returns to scale subsequently go bankrupt, while those performing at 
decreasing returns to scale subsequently merge.  
Some new directions for analysis within the above approach can be mapped 
out. First, a different type of efficiency estimation techniques can be employed – the 
stochastic frontier for instance. Second, the factors conditioning the dynamics of 
efficiency need be identified which could be achieved by using a panel econometric 
model where efficiency is regressed with a number of variables – economic and other. 
Normally, this type of analysis - the so-called regression analysis - comprises the 
second stage of the modern research of bank’s efficiency (once the efficiency has 
been measured). These two options relate to the technical sophistications. With regard 
to expanding the scope of research, it would be well to have a comparative analysis 
done of the banking efficiency in the Balkan countries between the two World Wars 
including the other credit institutions such as credit co-operations, popular banks, etc. 
Of course, empirical measurements must be complemented by “in-depth” historical 
and sociological investigations of individual banks and credit institutions, as these 
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      1923  1928  1923  1928 








    CRS CRS VRS VRS 
Bank 
No. 
Bank’s Name  Efficiency  Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency 
1 Banka  na 
tutunoproizvoditelite 
0.70795 0.34550 0.72119 0.45856 
2  Napreduk  0.51104 0.36199 0.53891 0.36306 
3  Union  0.63034 0.52180 0.65358 0.54051 
4  Zora  0.43812 0.43349 0.51752 0.56189 
5  Balkanska  banka  0.91788 0.88901 0.92296 0.98926 
6  Asbarez  0.54852 0.49531 0.57267 0.63462 
7  Bulgaria  0.56061 0.62683 0.57288 0.70707 
8  Оtechestvo  0.86130 0.72680 0.88178 1.00000 
9  Banka za naroden kredit   0.76602  0.58502  0.81323  0.64210 
10  Banka za turgovia i kredit   0.65267  0.54127  0.66188  0.57230 
11  Banka za turgovia industria 
i knijnina 
0.74913 0.55217 0.77361 0.55629 
12  Banka na suedinenite 
industrii 
0.17264 0.24137 0.22167 0.51903 
13  Bulgarska kreditna banka   0.17240  0.54312  0.17284  0.54705 
14 Turgovski  sgovor  1.00000  0.66600  1.00000  0.91354 
15 BNB  1.00000  0.52983  1.00000 1.00000 
16  Burgaska  banka  0.49489 0.57928 0.51810 0.59038 
17  Suedinenie  0.72704 0.51802 0.74221 0.55030 
18  Bulgarska banka AD  0.86081  0.40678  0.91073  0.60561 
19 Bulgarska  garancionna 
banka 
0.59421 0.56983 0.62698 1.00000 
20  Bulgarska generalna banka  0.28596  0.81889  1.00000  0.89952 
21 Bulgarska  zemedelska 
banka 
0.69490 0.88041 1.00000 1.00000 
22 Bulgarska  skontova  banka  0.45383 0.85086 0.60745 1.00000 
23  Bulgarska spestovna banka  0.78490  0.69653  1.00000  0.79049 
24  Bulgarska stopanska banka  0.62726  0.79131  0.63303  0.83106 
25  Bulgarska turgovska banka  0.88441  1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
26  Bulgarska centralna banka  0.21781  0.16043  0.28382  0.49460 
27 Bulgarsko-amerikanska 
banka 
1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
28 Bulgarsko-palestinska 
banka 
0.41545 0.48345 0.43331 0.49152 
29  Vidinska banka   0.64367  0.82038  0.66091  0.83018 
30 Gornooriahovska  banka 0.81051 0.63734 0.83433 1.00000 
31 Dupnishka  turgovska 
kredita banka 




32  Evreiska popularna banka  0.83810 0.70634 0.85200 1.00000 
33  Elenska turgovska banka  0.15752  0.17906  0.23001  0.34891 
34 Iznosno-vnosna  banka  0.50615 0.19177 0.52460 1.00000 
35 Industrialna  banka  1.00000  0.73801  1.00000  0.78718 
36 Internacionalna  banka 
Bulgaria 
0.08847 0.49708 0.30873 1.00000 
37  Italianska i Bulgarska 
turgovska banka 
0.71257 0.50440 0.75676 0.85923 
38  Kreditna  banka  0.59037 0.89235 0.62651 0.99739 
39 Loveshka  turgovska 
akcionerna banka 
0.88626 0.59424 0.91882 0.66883 
40  Oriahovska turgovska banka  0.27861 0.38517 0.30205 0.50150 
41  Plevenska turgovska banka  0.56147  0.42801  0.56498  0.47216 
42  Selsko-esnafska banka   0.86799  0.38626  0.89458  0.39818 
43  Sofiiska  banka  0.42191 0.47294 0.44585 0.47394 
44  Gradivo  0.96936 0.05751 0.97967 0.71699 
45  Trakiiska  banka  0.59661 0.67791 0.61120 0.73110 
46  Zemledelec  0.41608 0.78843 0.42098 0.98061 
47  Turgovsko kreditna banka  0.41153  0.89152  0.42702  0.91642 
48 Plovdiv  0.22894  0.08115  1.00000  0.69944 
49  Franko-belgiiska banka za 
Bulgaria 
0.40232 0.20626 0.41149 1.00000 
50 Franko-bulgarska 
ipotekarna banka 







      1923  1928  1923   1928 








    CRS CRS VRS VRS 
Bank 
No. 
Bank’s Name  Efficiency  Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency 
1 Banka  na 
tutunopriozvoditelite 
0.70795 0.34550 0.72119 0.45856
2 Napreduk  0.51104 0.36199 0.53891  0.36306
3 Union  0.63034 0.52180 0.65358  0.54051
4 Zora  0.43812 0.43349 0.51752  0.56189
5  Balkanska  banka      
6 Asbarez  0.54852 0.49531 0.57267  0.63462
7 Bulgaria  0.56061 0.62683 0.57288  0.70707
8 Otechestvo  0.86130 0.72680 0.88178  1.00000
9  Banka za naroden kredit   0.76602 0.58502 0.81323  0.64210
10  Banka za turgovia i kredit  0.65267 0.54127 0.66188  0.57230
11  Banka za turgovia industria i 
knijnina 
0.74913 0.55217 0.77361 0.55629
12  Banka na suedinenite 
industrii 
0.17264 0.24137 0.22167 0.51903
13  Bulgarska kreditna banka  0.17240 0.54312 0.17284  0.54705
14 Turgovski  sgovor  1.00000 0.66600 1.00000  0.91354
15 BNB  1.00000 0.52983 1.00000 1.00000
16 Burgaska  banka  0.49489 0.57928 0.51810  0.59038
17 Suedinenie  0.72704 0.51802 0.74221  0.55030
18  Bulgarka  banka  AD      
19  Bulgarska garancionna banka  0.59421 0.56983 0.62698  1.00000
20  Bulgarska  generalna  banka      
21  Bulgarska zemedelska banka  0.69490 0.88041 1.00000 1.00000
22 Bulgarska  skontova  banka  0.45383 0.85086 0.60745 1.00000
23  Bulgariska spestovna banka  0.78490 0.69653 1.00000  0.79049
24  Bulgarska stopanska banka  0.62726 0.79131 0.63303  0.83106
25  Bulgarska turgovska banka  0.88441 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
26 Bulgarska  centralna 
kooperativna banka 
0.21781 0.16043 0.28382 0.49460
27 Bulgarsko-amerikanska 
banka 
1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
28 Bulgarsko-palestinska  banka  0.41545 0.48345 0.43331  0.49152
29  Vidinska banka   0.64367 0.82038 0.66091  0.83018
30 Gornooriahovska  banka 0.81051 0.63734 0.83433  1.00000
31  Dupnishka turgovska kreditna 
banka 
0.67519 0.71979 0.69881 0.79240
32  Evreiska popularna banka 0.83810 0.70634 0.85200  1.00000
33  Elenska turgovska banka  0.15752 0.17906 0.23001  0.34891
34 Iznosnо-vnosna banka  0.50615 0.19177 0.52460  1.00000
35 Industrialna  banka  1.00000 0.73801 1.00000  0.78718
36 Internacionalna  banka 
Bulgaria 




37  Italianska i Bulgarska 
turgovska banka 
0.71257 0.50440 0.75676 0.85923
38  Kreditna  banka      
39  Loveshka turgovska banka 
akcionerna banka 
0.88626 0.59424 0.91882 0.66883
40  Oriahovska turgovska banka 0.27861 0.38517 0.30205  0.50150
41  Plevenska turgovska banka  0.56147 0.42801 0.56498  0.47216
42 Selsko-esnafska  banka  0.86799 0.38626 0.89458  0.39818
43 Sofiiska  banka  0.42191 0.47294 0.44585  0.47394
44 Gradivo  0.96936 0.05751 0.97967  0.71699
45 Trakiiska  banka  0.59661 0.67791 0.61120  0.73110
46 Zemledelec  0.41608 0.78843 0.42098  0.98061
47  Turgovsko kreditna banka  0.41153 0.89152 0.42702  0.91642
48 Plovdiv  0.22894 0.08115 1.00000  0.69944
49  Franko-belgiiska banka za 
Bulgaria 
0.40232 0.20626 0.41149  1.00000
50 Franko-belgiiska  ipotekarna 
banka 









      1923  1928  1923  1928 








    CRS CRS VRS VRS 
Bank 
No. 
Bank’s Name  Efficiency  Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency 
1 Banka  na 
tutunoproizvoditelite 
0.11425 0.23972 0.17567 0.66005 
2  Napreduk  0.11581 0.39560 0.11733 0.44245 
3  Union  0.10704 0.53712 0.14297 0.59201 
4  Zora  0.43812 0.13918 0.47822 0.35289 
5  Balkanska  banka     
6  Asbarez  0.22736 0.33163 0.28160 0.61047 
7  Bulgaria  0.23063 0.44066 0.27975 0.57079 
8  Otechestvo  0.50937 0.41276 0.51566 1.00000 
9  Banka za naroden kredit  0.18305  0.61517  0.26879  0.87064 
10  Banka za turgovia i kredit  0.33633  0.44075  0.36706  0.51520 
11  Banka za turgovia industria 
i knijnina 
0.38613 0.75373 0.38613 0.75490 
12  Banka na suedinenite 
industrii 
0.17264 0.02535 0.18664 0.14321 
13  Bulgarska kreditna banka  0.12819  0.42224  0.13336  0.42968 
14 Turgovski  sgovor  0.21341  0.31897  0.39572  0.95020 
15 BNB  0.62873  0.39742  1.00000 1.00000 
16  Burgaska  banka  0.17646 0.67170 0.18329 0.70972 
17  Suedinenie  0.23354 0.21067 0.25351 0.24134 
18  Bulgarska banka AD         
19 Bulgarska  garancionna 
banka 
0.36445 0.35474 0.47338 1.00000 
20  Bulgarska generalna banka         
21 Bulgarska  zemedelska 
banka 
0.10261 0.16902 1.00000 1.00000 
22 Bulgarska  skontova  banka  0.41451 0.23229 0.60160 0.51152 
23  Bulgarska spestovna banka  0.67260  0.73367  1.00000  1.00000 
24  Bulgarska stopanska banka   0.15907  0.57314  0.27288  0.68646 
25  Bulhgarska turgovska banka  0.17367  0.63749 1.00000 1.00000 
26 Bulgarska  centralna 
kooperativna banka 
0.18087 0.18099 0.28382 0.49460 
27 Bulgarsko-amerikanska 
banka 
1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
28 Bulgarsko-palestinska 
banka 
0.13867 0.32488 0.15556 0.34388 
29  Vidinska banka   0.64367  0.70957  0.65877  0.73593 
30 Gornooriahovska  banka 1.00000 0.85251 1.00000 1.00000 
31 Dupnishka  turgovska 
kreditna banka 
0.16877 0.60032 0.21789 0.75108 
32  Evreiska popularna banka  0.49687 0.23478 0.56099 0.83159 
33  Elenska turgovska banka  0.03564  0.21787  0.14226  1.00000 




35 Industrialna  banka  0.30161  1.00000  0.33083  1.00000 
36 Internacionalna  banka 
Bulgaria 
0.10057 0.69658 0.33671 1.00000 
37  Italianska i Bulgarska 
turgovska banka 
0.48201 0.71312 1.00000 1.00000 
38  Kreditna  banka      
39 Loveshka  turgovska 
akcionerna banka 
0.16109 0.59977 0.19927 0.87451 
40  Oriahovska turgovska banka  0.09079 0.36899 0.16838 0.70163 
41  Plevenska turgovska banka  0.26838  0.35255  0.32620  0.46981 
42  Selsko-esnafska banka   0.29967  0.90727  0.41771  0.97344 
43  Sofiiska  banka  0.23104 0.48705 0.28026 0.49941 
44  Gradivo  0.96936 0.01746 0.96936 0.55728 
45  Trakiiska  banka  0.24411 0.57190 0.28941 0.68514 
46  Zemledelec  0.09696 0.26646 0.12078 0.29061 
47  Turgovsko kreditna banka  0.14741  0.41916  0.16568  0.94529 
48 Plovdiv  0.22894  0.08115  0.63090  0.54108 
49  Franko-belgiiska banka za 
Bulgaria 
0.30326 0.33067 0.57058 1.00000 
50 Franko-bulgarska 
ipotekarna banka 






















Appendix II:   Data Envelopment Analysis – a basic presentation  
 
In case of multiple input and output factors the efficiency score
7 is defined as: 
Efficiency = Weighted sum of outputs 
                    Weighted sum of inputs 
The efficiency scores of the separate decision making units (DMUs), calculated by 
using the data envelopment analysis (DEA), obtains values between 0 and 1. When 
the DMU receives efficiency score of 1, then it forms the efficiency frontier and lies 
on it.    
The optimal weights are obtained by solving the presented mathematical 
programming problem: 
 
           ( 1 )  
Subject to  
 
For each of I firms there are N inputs and M outputs. In that case the column vectors xi 
and yi represent the set of inputs and outputs respectively for the i-th firm, while the 
data for all I firms is represented by the NxI input matrix, X, and the MxI output 
matrix, Y. 
The following multiplier form avoids the problem of obtaining an infinite number of 
solutions by imposing a new constraint: 
 
           ( 2 )  
Subject to  
 
 
The equivalent envelopment form of this linear programming problem is the preferred 
one to solve, as it involves fewer constraints than the multiplier form (AII.2):  
 
           ( 3 )  
Subject to  
 
 
Here θ is a scalar, and λ is an Ix1 vector of constants (i.e. weights). The value of θ 
obtained is the efficiency score of the i-th firm and it satisfies θ ≤ 1, where a value of 
1 indicates a point on the frontier, i.e. a technically efficient firm. To obtain the value 
                                                 
7 The presented specifications of the DEA models are based on Coelli et al. (2005), where more 
detailed information on efficiency measurement models could be found. 
) / ( max
' '
, i i v u x v y u
I j ,...., 2 , 1 = 1 /
' ' ≤ j j x v y u
0 , ≥ v u
) ( max
'
, I v u y u
I j j ,..., ,..., 2 , 1 0 =
1
' = I x v
0 , ≥ v u
0
' ' ≤ − j j x v y u
θ λ θ, min
0 ≥ Υ + − λ I y
0 ≥ λ




of  θ for each firm, the linear programming model must be solved I times. The 
presented approach to the linear programming problem (AII.2) assumes constant 
returns to scale (CRS). The CRS problem can be easily modified to account for VRS 
by adding a convexity constraint, which allows to envelope the data points more 
tightly than under the CRS specification and thus provides technical efficiency scores 
that are greater than or equal to those obtained using the CRS model. The VRS linear 
programming problem is: 
 
           ( 4 )  
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